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NOTES
In re Jenoptik AG: The Fine Line Between Judicial
Assistance and Circumvention of Foreign Law in
International Discovery
I. Introduction
Litigation in the modem era frequently transcends national
boundaries and requires cooperation between foreign states and
parties of differing citizenship.' In the course of such litigation,
the ideals of comity2 and sovereignty3 often conflict. It is then up
to the courts of the interested nations to strike an appropriate
balance between assisting a foreign court or litigant and impinging
upon the forum state's ability to exercise control over its courts.4
United States federal courts have had the power to assist foreign
tribunals since 1855 when Congress granted them the ability to
' See, e.g., In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1153 (1 1th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter In re Trinidad
and Tobago].
2 "Comity" is "a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out
of deference and good will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). Comity is
also "the basis of international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private
international law, a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill
between sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity, or 'considerations of
high international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable
relationships between nations."' Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991).
I "Sovereignty" is "[tihe supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which
any independent state is governed; . . . the international independence of a state,
combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign
dictation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396.
4 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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compel the testimony of witnesses.5 Since that time, Congress has
broadened the power of courts to assist foreign tribunals and
litigants in discovery,6 while the courts have endeavored to
interpret and refine the limitations and requirements of this power.7
The Federal Circuit, in In re Jenoptik AG,8 faced the issue of
whether discoverability in a foreign state imposed such a
limitation upon the court. 9  Specifically, the circuit had to
determine if information sought in a United States court for use in
a foreign action must be discoverable in the foreign forum before
the court can assist a foreign litigant with such discovery.' ° The
court did not have at its disposal precedent directly on point,
although two distinct lines of cases have dealt with foreign
discovery in other contexts." In cases where litigants have
requested assistance under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, courts have held
"that a party to foreign litigation is not entitled to discover...
information that is insulated from discovery in the foreign court in
which the action is pending."' 2 When foreign parties to an action
5 See In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1152 (discussing the history and
development of the power to assist); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994).
6 See In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1152-54; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782
(1994).
7 See infra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
' 109 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
9 See id. at 722.
'o See id.
' See infra notes 68-107 and accompanying text.
12 In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994) "permits a district court to compel a person to give testimony
or produce documents for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal." Id. at 723.
Section 1782 says, in pertinent part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order
him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be
made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or
international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may
direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing
be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his
appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath
and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and
procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the
foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or
INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY
in the United States have failed to produce evidence in compliance
with court orders, American courts have refused to penalize such
parties when there was a good faith effort to comply and when
production would violate the laws of the foreign state where
discovery was sought. 3
In Jenoptik, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
properly granted a motion to modify a protective order, thereby
releasing deposition passages on trade secrets previously
discovered in a suit in the United States for use in a related suit
between the same parties in Germany.' 4 The court held that the
discoverability of the deposition in the German court was not the
appropriate inquiry because the request was not an action to
conduct discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Section 1782 allows
parties to a foreign proceeding to request assistance in obtaining
evidence located in the United States without filing suit in an
American court.6 The parallel German and American suits in
Jenoptik made application to conduct discovery under § 1782
unnecessary, as the information sought was already in the hands of
the party seeking to use it in Germany. 7 Thus the party requesting
assistance was able to obtain evidence for use in the German
action which it could not have discovered under German law. 8 In
releasing the information, the court failed to consider the ideals of
comity and sovereignty, or to balance these interests with the duty
statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the
order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken,
and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994).
3 See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
14 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 723.
'5 See id.
6 See id. at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 723.
18 See id. at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the
discoverability of trade secrets under German law, see infra notes 40-44 and
accompanying text.
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to aid foreign process and to avoid circumvention of foreign law. 9
Part II of this Note will examine the facts and procedural
history of the Jenoptik case and discuss the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Federal Circuit.20 Part III will analyze
the background law prior to Jenoptik . Part IV will assess the
significance :of Jenoptik in light of the preceding case law.
22
Finally, in Part V, the Note concludes that the Federal Circuit's
decision emphasized form over substance in allowing the release
of the deposition for use in Germany.23 The conclusion explains
that the potential for circumvention of foreign law through related
lawsuits in the United States is too great, and that the resulting
encroachment into foreign sovereignty violates the spirit of the law
and the public policy of the United States.24 In ruling on requests
for assistance in discovery, federal courts should examine the
discoverability of information in the foreign state in order to
prevent circumvention of foreign law through American courts. 5
Discoverability takes on even greater importance when requests
for assistance are made by litigants, rather than foreign courts, and
when evidence is of a sensitive nature. 6
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts and the District Court Ruling
Therma-Wave, Inc. sued Jenoptik AG in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a
declaratory judgment that Jenoptik's products infringed upon
Therma-Wave's U.S. patents "related to a method and apparatus
for detecting thermal waves."27 Therma-Wave brought a similar
"9 See id. at 725-26 (Newman, J., dissenting).
20 See infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 61-115 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 116-137 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 133-144 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
26 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 724 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
27 Id. at 722.
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action in Germany for Jenoptik's alleged infringement of a related
German patent." The California district court entered a stipulated
protective order governing confidential information disclosed
during discovery.29  Some information was designated
"Confidential," while other information was designated
"Confidential-Trial Counsel - Only" (Confidential-TCO). 0
Therma-Wave later requested that the district court modify the
protective order so that portions of the deposition testimony
designated Confidential-TCO could be presented to the German
court.3' The district court granted Therma-Wave's request,
modifying the protective order to permit use of the deposition
passages in the German court and requesting that the German court
maintain the appropriate confidentiality.32 Jenoptik then petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order.33
B. The Federal Circuit Decision
Judicial orders may be overturned for "a clear abuse of
discretion or usurpation of judicial authority in the grant of the
order." 34 The petitioner bears the burden of establishing its clear
and indisputable right to issuance of the writ.3" The Federal
Circuit outlined three reasons given by Jenoptik in its request to
vacate the order:
(1) [T]he district court failed to adequately address and protect
Jenoptik' s interest in maintaining Confidential-TCO






33 See id. Jenoptik filed its petition for a writ of mandamus on November 21,
1996. See id. Therma-Wave filed a response' on November 26, 1996, and the court
denied the petition on November 27, 1996. See id. The German trial began November
28, 1996. See id. The order denying the writ of mandamus stated that discussion and
dissent would follow. See id. This opinion, filed March 7, 1997, explains the court's
disposition of the matter. See id. at 721-22.
34 In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
31 See id. (citing Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)).
1998]
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consider that the modification order would circumvent the
discovery procedure of German courts, and (3) the district court
modified the protective order without sufficient reasons because
the deposition testimony at issue did not conflict with
statements in Jenoptik's brief in the German court.36
The court quickly eliminated the first argument, finding that,
"in view of Therma-Wave's offer in the district court to continue
to comply with the provisions of the protective order," Therma-
Wave was bound with regard to the TCO provisions; thus
Jenoptik's right to issuance on those grounds was not clear and
indisputable. 7 The court similarly rejected the third argument
since any conflict with Jenoptik's brief in the German court could
only be resolved by the German court.38
The court focused its attention on the argument regarding
discoverability in Germany.39  Jenoptik argued that "the
modification order circumvented the discovery procedure of
German courts and that the district court was required to consider
the discoverability of the documents in a German court. 40 The
question of discoverability becomes particularly important in light
of the nature of the information.41 Jenoptik claimed that "the
material in the deposition contained trade secrets., 42 The only way
that German courts can obtain the testimony of a witness is
through live courtroom testimony, and a witness can refuse to
testify about trade secrets.43 Jenoptik argued that the court should
have considered the discoverability of the trade secret information
in Germany, and refused Therma-Wave's request to modify the
protective order."
The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that "discoverability
36 In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 722.
17 Id. at 723.
38 See id. at 723-24.








of the excerpts was not the appropriate inquiry., 45 The court thus
refused to apply the discoverability considerations found in § 1782
cases as this was not an action under that statute.4'6 The court relied
instead on a Ninth Circuit case, Beckman Industries, Inc. v.
International Insurance Co. 4 7 The Ninth Circuit stated in Beckman
that "precedent strongly favors disclosure to meet the needs of
parties in pending litigation" and that confidentiality could be
protected by placing the parties under the same restrictions as in
the original protective order.4' For these same reasons the Federal
Circuit denied Jenoptik's petition for a writ of mandamus.49
C. Dissent to the Federal Circuit Decision
The dissent in Jenoptik emphasized the importance of
discoverability of evidence in the foreign state, urging that "[i]t is
not the role of this nation's courts to adjust the positions of the
parties before the tribunal in Germany, by circumventing German
law."50 As the dissent observed, Therma-Wave stated that unless
the deposition was released by the American court, it might never
be used in the German litigation because it would be protected by
German law.5 The dissent further proclaimed that United States
courts "have the obligation, in law, international comity, and
sound practice, not only to aid foreign process when requested, but
also to avoid aiding in deliberate circumvention of foreign laws
and procedures."52
In support of this position, the dissent stressed that the request
for assistance was not from the German court, but from a litigant,
and that the litigant was not under a German court order to
4" Id. The court held that the only relevant issue was the confidentiality of the
testimony and, since the testimony had already been discovered in the U.S. suit, the
modification order did not circumvent German law. See id.
46 See id.
47 966 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1992). For a further discussion of Beckman, see infra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
48 Id.
49 See In Re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 723-24.
51 Id. at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting).
5' See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 726 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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produce the evidence. Additionally, the dissent noted that the
German court had jurisdiction over Jenoptik, which was a German
company.54 Therefore, if the disputed evidence was admissible
under German law, the German court could have ordered its
production without American help, especially when the
confidential information originated in Germany and when the
"witness at issue" was a Jenoptik employee who resided in
Germany.55
The dissent also relied upon parallels between the Jenoptik
case and an action to conduct discovery under § 1782, pointing out
that several circuits have held that "a party to foreign litigation is
not entitled to discover ...information that is insulated from
discovery in the foreign court in which the action is pending.
Jenoptik submitted the affidavit of an expert in German law, who
stated that testimony would have to be heard in open court, and
that a witness may "legally refuse to answer questions concerning
business or industrial secrets. 57 The dissent pointed to a recent
case where the Federal Circuit "recognized that foreign countries
have different discovery rules and different laws governing trade
secrets, and that these may not match United States practices."58
Taking these factors in the aggregate, the dissent argued that
placing trade secret information, not discoverable under German
law, in evidence in Germany amounted to an improper use of
United States discovery procedures.59 The dissent, therefore,
concluded that the district court order modifying the protective
5 See id. at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting). A direct petition from the German court
would have made an inquiry into discoverability unnecessary, as the participation of the
court would show such discoverability. See id. Judge Newman quoted John Deere v.
Sperry, which held that a petition from a foreign tribunal would leave "little question as
to the propriety of honoring the request for assistance." Id. (citing John Deere Ltd. v.
Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1985)).
54 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 725 (Newman, J., dissenting).
55 See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 725 (Newman, J., dissenting).
58 Id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA,
Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Judge Newman wrote the court's
opinion in Cochran. See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
59 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d at 725 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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order to permit use of the evidence in Germany was inappropriate
and should not have been sustained.6°
III. Background Law
In addition to the Beckman Industries case relied upon by the
majority, the Federal Circuit encountered precedent of two
principal types: (1) cases interpreting and applying § 1782
requests for judicial assistance, and (2) cases in which United
States courts refused to penalize parties for failure to disclose
information that they could not legally obtain under the laws of a
foreign country where such information was located.6' In the
§ 1782 cases, the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits and the
District Courts for the Central District of California and Eastern
District of Pennsylvania have held that foreign litigants were not
entitled to discovery beyond that allowed in the forum state. 62 The
Second Circuit has held that a court's inquiry into the
discoverability of materials requested under § 1782 should
consider only authoritative proof of discoverability and should
attempt to accommodate the evidence-gathering practices of other
nations. 6' The cases regarding the failure of a litigant in a United
States court to comply with orders for production have held that
the litigant should not be penalized where a good faith effort had
been made to comply. 64
A. Beckman Industries
In Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Insurance Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed an
order of the District Court for the Central District of California
modifying a protective order to allow access to six deposition
transcripts for use in a similar action pending against the same
61defendant in California state court. The court based its
I See id. at 724 (Newman, J., dissenting).
61 See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
62 See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
65 See Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir.
1992). The Federal Circuit considered the application of § 1782 to be inappropriate in
1998]
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affirmance on the district court's findings of the importance of
access to the documents, a lack of prejudice to the defendant, and
the absence of extraordinary circumstances militating against
modification.66 The court observed that "Ninth Circuit precedent
strongly favors disclosure to meet the needs of parties in pending
litigation," but also recognized that reliance on a protective order
was a factor to be considered and that the reliance would be
greater where a trade secret was involved.67
B. Cases Applying and Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1782
In 1980 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania encountered a case requiring interpretation of
§ 1782.68 The court, in In re Court of the Commissioner of Patents
for the Republic of South Africa, held that the fact that a requesting
party is a litigant in the foreign action complicates the analysis of
the court's appropriate exercise of discretion, though it does not
affect the litigant's right to petition the court for assistance. 69 The
court expressed concern that the requested evidence would not be
discoverable under the law of the foreign state and held that,
absent a showing by the petitioner that the information requested
was discoverable, the court could not honor the request. ° The
court stated that it should not exercise its discretion under § 1782
to allow litigants to circumvent the restrictions imposed on
discovery by foreign tribunals as "[flew actions could more
significantly impede the development of international cooperation
among courts than if the courts of the United States operated to
give litigants in foreign cases processes of law to which they were
Jenoptik. In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1997). According to the
court, confidentiality, rather than discoverability, was the dispositive issue. See
generally id. at 723-24. It therefore found Beckman "instructive" because the Ninth
Circuit, whose law the Federal Circuit was applying in Jenoptik, determined the
appropriateness of a district court ruling which modified "a protective order to permit
confidential materials to be used in a different court proceeding." Id. at 723.
66 See id. at 475.
67 Id.
68 See In re Court of the Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South
Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1980).




not entitled in the appropriate foreign tribunals."'"
The Third Circuit in 1985 handed down its decision in John
Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., one of the most important cases on the
issue of discoverability.72 In considering a request to compel
discovery for use in a Canadian court, the Third Circuit held that
admissibility is an issue for the foreign tribunal when the
information sought would be discoverable if all the involved
parties were within the tribunal's jurisdiction.73 However, the
court stated that a "grant of discovery that trenched upon the
clearly established procedures of a foreign tribunal" would not be
permitted under § 1782."4  The court relied upon the
"considerations of comity and sovereignty that pervade
international law"75 and emphasized that its decision did not
"countenance the use of U.S. discovery procedures to evade the
limitations placed on domestic pre-trial disclosure by foreign
tribunals. 76 Additionally, the court warned that its "[c]oncern that
foreign discovery not be circumvented by procedures authorized in
American courts is particularly pronounced where a request for
assistance issues not from letters rogatory, but from an individual
litigant."
77
The Eleventh Circuit decided two cases in this area in 1988.78
In Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, the court remanded an order of the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida for a
determination on the discoverability of the requested evidence.79 It
held that the district court was required to determine the
71 Id.
72 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
13 See id. at 136-37.
74 Id. at 135.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 136.
77 Id. at 136. A "letter rogatory" is "[t]he medium whereby one country, speaking
through one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts and by
methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to
assist the administration of justice in the former country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
905 (6th ed. 1990).
78 See Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11 th Cir. 1988); In re Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 151 (11 th Cir. 1988).
79 See Lo Ka Chun, 858 F.2d at 1566.
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discoverability of testimony of nonparty witnesses in a foreign
forum before issuing subpoenas duces tecum.8° The court, in
reaching this holding, relied upon its decision in In re Trinidad
and Tobago, handed down that same year.8 In the prior case, the
court concluded that "[w]hile a district court generally should not
decide whether the requested evidence will be admissible in the
foreign court . . . the district court must decide whether the
evidence would be discoverable in the foreign country before
granting assistance. 82 The court stressed that if a district court
judge "doubts that a proceeding is forthcoming or suspects that the
request is a 'fishing expedition' or a vehicle for harassment, the
district court should deny the request."83
The First Circuit faced a similar petition for assistance in 1992.
In overruling a grant of assistance in In re Application of Asta
Medica, S.A., 4 the court held that a litigant requesting help to
obtain evidence for use in a foreign proceeding must show that the
information sought would be discoverable in the foreign
jurisdiction." The court stated that Congress intended for the
burden of proof to fall upon the applicant and expressed concern
that § 1782 could be used to circumvent foreign law and
procedures if such a showing was not required.86 If such a use was
allowed, the court noted that a litigant would gain an unfair
advantage and, more importantly, foreign countries might be
offended by the use of United States procedures to circumvent
their own procedures and laws.87 The court concluded that the
concept of comity and the broader goal of stimulating cooperation
80 See id. A "subpoena duces tecum" is "[a] court process, initiated by [a] party in
litigation, compelling production of certain specific documents and other items, material
and relevant to facts in issue in a pending judicial proceeding, which documents and
items are in [the] custody and control of [the] person or body served with process."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990).
81 See Lo Ka Chun, 858 F.2d at 1566.
82 In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156.
83 Id.
4 981 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1992).
85 See id. at 7.
86 See id. at 6-7.
87 See id. at 6.
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in international and foreign litigations required that the district
court make a discovery determination based upon the submissions
of the parties.
The District Court for the Central District of California has
rendered a recent decision in a § 1782 case.89 The court, in In re
Chancery Division, England, held that English litigants requesting
assistance from the court in obtaining the deposition of a U.S.
citizen were not entitled to discovery beyond that available in the
English court where the action was proceeding.9 °  The court
distinguished several Ninth Circuit cases where requests were
from the foreign tribunal rather than the litigant, stressing that
"[w]here the request is made by an adverse party in a foreign
proceeding ... the federal courts must exercise caution to prevent
the circumvention of foreign discovery provisions and
procedures."9' The Court then stated that the purpose of § 1782,
"was to foster jurisprudential comity and cooperation between the
United States and foreign countries...,to facilitate compliance by
U.S. citizens with foreign court proceedings and to maintain
respect for foreign countries' sovereign jurisdiction."92
The Second Circuit has addressed § 1782 in a line of cases to
which neither the Jenpotik majority nor dissent cites. Most
recently, in In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 93 the court held
that a comprehensive inquiry into foreign law to determine the
"existence and extent of discovery in the forum nation" would not
be appropriate in § 1782 actions.94 The court refused to require the
exhaustion of discovery procedures in the forum state, holding that
discoverability under the laws of the foreign state would be but a
single factor that a district court may consider in applying its
88 See id. at 7.
89 See In re Application for an Order for 'Judicial Assistance in a Foreign
Proceeding in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D. 223,
226 (C.D. Cal. 1993) [hereinafter In re Chancery Division, England].
90 See id. at 226.
91 Id. (citing John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1985)).
92 Id.
9' 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
94 Id. at 1099.
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discretion.9  However, the court stated that a district court's
examination into discoverability should respect "authoritative
proof that a foreign tribunal would reject" the requested evidence.96
The court held that "[s]uch proof, as embodied in a forum
country's judicial, executive, or legislative declarations that
specifically address the use of evidence gathered under foreign
procedure, would provide helpful and appropriate guidance to a
district court in the exercise of its discretion., 97 Such a limited
inquiry would fulfill the court's requirement of a reasonable
attempt to accommodate the evidence-gathering procedures of
other jurisdictions in order to avoid giving offense to foreign
states.98
C. U.S. Cases Refusing to Penalize Foreign Litigants for
Failure to Produce
In Socijtj Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,99 the United States Supreme Court
encountered the implications of comity and sovereignty in
international discovery from an opposing perspective. The Court
held that the failure of a litigant in a United States suit to comply
with an order for production of documents did not justify the
dismissal of the case when the party made a good faith effort to
comply but was prevented by foreign law.'°° In this case, possible
criminal sanctions in Switzerland limited the litigant's ability to
comply with the production order. 1 Since compliance would
have violated Swiss criminal laws, the Court refused to penalize
the litigant by dismissing the case.'02
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently
95 See id. at 1098 (citing In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1993);
In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 861, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992)).
96 Id. at 1100.
97 Id.
98 See generally id. at 1101.
99 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
"o See id. at 212-12.
'o' See id. at 211.
102 See id. at 211-12.
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considered a similar issue in Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec
USA, Inc.'°3 The Federal Circuit vacated the orders of the District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which had imposed
sanctions on Uwatec for failure to produce a copy of computer
programming code for use in a patent infringement action in the
United States. '°4 Uwatec had filed the appropriate actions in
Switzerland in an attempt to produce a printed copy, but the Swiss
court ruled that Uwatec had no right to such a copy because the
code belonged to the corporation that had developed it.' °5 The
court stated that Socijtj Internationale required United States
courts to "balance the interests and needs of the parties in light of
the nature of the foreign law and the party's efforts to comply in
good faith with the demanded production."'0'6 The court held that
in light of Uwatec's good faith attempts, the potential for criminal
sanctions in Switzerland, and the essential principles of
international comity, it would be improper to impose any sanctions
on Uwatec for failure to produce the requested documents.' °7
D. International Law
The case law that preceded Jenoptik emphasized the ideals of
international comity and sovereignty.0 8 These considerations are
paramount to the international goals of cooperation and
reciprocity.i' 9 Additional support for these ideals can be found in
the agreements and negotiations between nations throughout the
twentieth century on the issue of discovery."0  In preparing the
draft Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad during the
Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference, the Committee stated
that "the method of taking the evidence must be 'tolerable' to the
'0' 102 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
'o See id. at 1225, 1232.
'o' See id. at 1229.
'06 Id. at 1227.
107 See id. at 1228-30.
108 See supra notes 68-107 and accompanying text.
'09 See In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154 (11 th Cir. 1988).
"1o See Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 806 (1969) (reporting on the
draft Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters).
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authorities of the State where it is taken and at the same time
'utilizable' in the forum where the action will be tried."' The
Committee stressed that "the doctrine of 'judicial sovereignty' had
to be constantly borne in mind," as the taking of evidence in civil
law nations differed significantly from the taking of evidence in
common law nations.2
The act of taking evidence in a common-law country from a
willing witness, without compulsion and without a breach of the
peace, in aid of a foreign proceeding, is a purely private matter
... [while] the same act in a civil-law country may be a public
matter, and may constitute the performance of a public judicial
act by an unauthorized foreign person. It may violate the
"judicial sovereignty" of the host country, unless its authorities
participate or give their consent."'
The Committee thus explained the importance of sovereignty, the
real risk of offending a foreign country by allowing its rules of
discovery to be circumvented, and the necessity of discoverability
in the forum state."14 International concerns mirror the concerns
expressed by the United States courts in the case law."5
IV. Significance of the Case
Jenoptik presented the issue of discoverability in a new
context."16 Courts had previously been confronted with the issue of
discoverability in a foreign forum only in the context of petitions
under § 1782,"' or in suits filed in the United States but requiring




114 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 68-107, 110-114 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
See In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995); In re
Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 58
F.2d 1564 (11 th Cir. 1988); In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 151 (11 th Cir. 1988);
John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Chancery Division,
England, 147 F.R.D. 223 (C.D. Cal. 1993); In re Court of the Commissioner of Patents
for the Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
118 See Soci~t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
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did not have at hand any decisions or statutes directly on point,
and was forced to extrapolate related information and concepts in
arriving at its decision."9  The court's conclusion that
confidentiality, rather than discoverability, was the relevant issue
avoided a difficult question, yet it may also have ignored the
principles of comity and sovereignty which form the basis not only
of § 1782 but of all international legal relations. 120
The Federal Circuit concluded that discoverability was not the
relevant issue because Therma-Wave was seeking only to modify
the protective order.12' The court stated that "it was solely the
confidentiality of the deposition testimony that was relevant to the
mandamus petition."' 2 2 Therefore, the court reasoned, the release
of the material for use in the German court did not circumvent
German rules of discovery, as the material in question was already
discovered, and only the protective order prevented its use in
Germany.22 This conclusion provides a bright line rule, but fails
to consider the international ramifications.
2 4
In deciding Cochran Consulting, the Federal Circuit relied
heavily upon principles of international law.125 The court, referring
to the Restatement (Second) on Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, stated that "when two nations have jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce national rules of law that are inconsistent,
each nation is required by international law to consider, in good
faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in
light of the law of the other nation."'126 The Restatement outlines
several factors to be considered, including the nature of the
parties' interests, the nature of the discovery that is sought, and the
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S. Ct. 1087 (1958); Cochran Consulting, Inc. v.
Uwatec USA, Inc. 102 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
19 See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
120 See In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1154.
121 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.
25 See Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1226-27
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
126 Id. at 1227 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965)).
1998]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
territory in which the discovery would occur."7 The Jenoptik court
failed to consider any of these factors.2 '
Instead the Federal Circuit focused on the form of the
petition.' 29 In doing so, the court failed to reconcile its decision
with the principles of international law or previous interpretations
of § 1782.130 Many of the past cases involving § 1782 expressed
the courts' concern that the statute could be used to circumvent the
foreign discovery laws of forum states. 3 ' These courts have
attempted to prevent such abuse of the more liberal U.S. discovery
procedures by requiring a showing of discoverability in the forum
state. In deciding that Therma-Wave is entitled to a
modification order, the Jenoptik court allowed confidential
deposition testimony, discovered in a United States action, to be
used in a related German proceeding, despite the testimony that
such information would not be discoverable under German law.
33
The circuit's ruling permits the circumvention of German law by
Therma-Wave, not through the use of § 1782 as the courts feared,
but through the complete avoidance of § 1782.14 Under the
Jenoptik holding, any litigant may obtain information that is not
discoverable in a foreign country, as long as a related suit is filed
in the United States.'35 The discovered information can then be
used in the related foreign suit. 136  The creation of such a legal
loophole does not reflect the international ideals of comity and
127 See Cochran Consulting, Inc. at 1227 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965)).
128 See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
129 See In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
130 See id.
131 See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
132 See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992).
133 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. German law and professional
ethics prohibit any contact between an attorney and witnesses or experts, such as in a
pre-trial interrogation or deposition, prior to a hearing before a judge. 1 E. J. COHN,
MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 46 (2d ed. 1968).
114 See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.






International litigation is an unavoidable result of international
relations and transactions. Conducting discovery in a foreign
jurisdiction is a necessary part of international litigation. The
United States and other nations have attempted to abide by the
ideals of international relations in permitting and conducting
discovery in the context of such litigation.' The U.S. Congress
addressed one aspect of discovery in § 1782, attempting to
facilitate cooperation between the United States and other nations
in interational litigation.' However, international legal norms
and concepts are equally applicable to questions which implicate
international discovery issues and conflicts yet are not expressly
answered by § 1782.140
The Federal Circuit's failure to consider these important
international legal norms in Jenoptik emphasizes form over
function and allows the circumvention of foreign discovery
procedures through the use of the U.S. court system.' 41  In
reviewing § 1782 requests, the various Circuits have expressed
concern that the trial courts would be overburdened if required to
interpret foreign discovery law in every case.14 1 Congress, as the
First Circuit noted, solved this problem by placing the "primary"
burden upon the § 1782 applicant.143  The First Circuit explained
that "[t]he only burden that would fall upon the district court is to
make a discovery determination based upon the submission by the
parties."' 4 Such an approach is equally applicable in a case like
Jenoptik. By allowing the release of evidence that would not be
discoverable in the forum state, the Federal Circuit has set
precedent allowing foreign litigants to circumvent the laws of
'37 See supra notes 2-4, 110-114 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992).
143 See id. at 7.
144 Id.
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foreign states through the use of American courts. Such use could
result in the violation of foreign sovereignty by the United States.
In keeping with international legal norms, parties requesting
judicial assistance in relation to a foreign action should be required
to show that the information sought would be discoverable in the
foreign state. The court could then make a determination based on
the parties' submissions, bearing in mind the ideals of comity and
sovereignty, and balancing the relative needs of the parties.
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